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Research Article
Does the ball bounce before touching the ground? Is the 
shadow cast before the light is switched on? No one 
would think this; but, if it did happen, would anyone see 
it? Laypeople and causal theorists alike regularly assume 
that the order of events is directly and objectively per-
ceived. From at least Hume (1748) onward, most meta-
physical and psychological theories of causation maintain 
that this perceived temporal order functions as one of the 
principal cues in causal learning and judgment.
Apart from the intuitive plausibility of this thesis, it has 
received strong experimental support: Children as young 
as 4 years old consistently choose the temporally prior 
event as the potent cause (Bullock & Gelman, 1979; 
Rankin & McCormack, 2012), whereas at the age of 6 to 
7 years, temporal-order information suffices to discrimi-
nate between common-cause and chain structures (Burns 
& McCormack, 2009). Adults also find it challenging to 
infer the causal structure of complex systems from covari-
ation information alone and improve significantly when 
given temporal cues (White, 2006). Covariational data 
can, even erroneously, be overridden in favor of tempo-
ral-order information, whereas interventions carry implicit 
temporal cues that partly explain their superiority over 
pure observations (Lagnado & Sloman, 2004, 2006).
Temporal-order judgments fall into two distinct cate-
gories, depending on timescale. For longer durations, the 
task is achieved by comparing perceptual inputs with 
memory contents. If you can remember an event, you 
can be fairly certain that it occurred before the event you 
currently perceive. At shorter timescales, however, the 
judgment of temporal order is not as straightforward. 
This becomes apparent if one considers the ability to 
perceive motion rather than a succession of still images. 
Seeing an object in motion requires the simultaneous 
perception of more than one “frame,” and this observa-
tion has led philosophers to posit the specious-present 
doctrine ( James, 1890): the idea that the subjective pres-
ent is not instantaneous but includes an extended period 
of “objective” time. Thus, if to perceive motion, multiple 
events must be perceived at once, how does the brain 
order them?
According to Grush (2007), “what is experienced 
within [an] interval is not a mere passive reflection of the 
world’s temporality, but is the result of active interpreta-
tion” (p. 2). We present experimental evidence in support 
of Grush’s thesis and furthermore propose that it is causal 
beliefs that guide the interpretation of temporal order.
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Abstract
Traditional approaches to human causal reasoning assume that the perception of temporal order informs judgments of 
causal structure. In this article, we present two experiments in which people followed the opposite inferential route: 
Perceptual judgments of temporal order were instead influenced by causal beliefs. By letting participants freely interact 
with a software-based “physics world,” we induced stable causal beliefs that subsequently determined participants’ 
reported temporal order of events, even when this led to a reversal of the objective temporal order. We argue that for 
short timescales, even when temporal-resolution capabilities suffice, the perception of temporal order is distorted to 
fit existing causal beliefs.
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Several experiments have shown influences of causal 
beliefs on perception. Scholl and Nakayama (2004) dem-
onstrated spatial illusions resulting from different causal 
interpretations, whereas Buehner and colleagues (Buehner, 
2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009) showed that the tem-
poral-binding effect (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; 
Stetson, Cui, Montague, & Eagleman, 2006) is attributable 
to causal beliefs, over and above intentionality or senso-
rimotor adaptation. When events A and B are considered 
to be causally related, they appear closer together in time; 
that is, they become causally bound (Buehner, 2012).
In the two experiments reported here, we extended 
these findings to show that causal beliefs not only influ-
ence the perception of temporal distance between events 
but also can lead to the reordering of these events, so 
that the perceived temporal order matches the expected 
causal order.
The Abstract Physics World
We developed a software-based “physics world” consist-
ing of various abstract objects, each with its own proper-
ties (Fig. 1; the physics world used in both experiments 
can be seen at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/ 
experiments/christos/causeAndTime/). The objects are 
stationary at the start of each trial, but some of them can 
be moved by the participant (a yellow hand appears over 
movable objects). When the “play” icon is clicked, the 
objects are activated and display a variety of predefined 
behaviors. Some objects move in a predefined direction 
as if affected by gravitational pull, whereas others remain 
static unless disturbed by another object. Objects can 
also interact through collisions and repulsions (at a dis-
tance), and some of these interactions lead to transforma-
tions of the objects themselves (e.g., changes in shape). 
Participants must learn the rules of the physics world 
through trial and error. The way the objects behave is 
governed by a physics engine, which makes the environ-
ment rich but predictable.
The main part of the experiment is presented as a 
puzzle game, in which the goal is to place a red rectangle 
inside a purple square by transforming it into a star. To 
achieve this, participants move objects around while the 
world is paused (Fig. 1b) and then click the “play” button 
to activate it. If unsuccessful, participants have to reset 
the stage to its initial configuration (Fig. 1a) and try again; 
if successful, participants see a congratulations message 
(Fig. 1c), and they progress to the next stage.
The various stages differ in terms of the objects pres-
ent, their initial positions, and which objects participants 
are allowed to move. Crucially, objects retain their prop-
erties from stage to stage (e.g., blue circles always repel 
other objects). This stability allows participants to learn 
the properties of the objects and the relationships among 
them. Given that participants lacked any specific prior 
knowledge, we were able to assess and manipulate peo-
ple’s acquired causal beliefs and study the influence of 
these beliefs on the perception of temporal order.
Experiment 1
In the first experiment, we used the physics world in a 
between-groups design. The experimental group played 
seven stages of the puzzle game (Fig. 1). The aim was to 
position the objects in a configuration such that when 
“play” was clicked, the red rectangle drifted into the pur-
ple square. However, the purple square only “admitted” 
stars, with other objects bouncing off its exterior. To 
transform the red rectangle into a star, a separate object, 
the green square, had to collide with the black platform. 
Fig. 1.  Sample frames from a stage in the physics world. The objects 
initially appear in a stationary configuration (a), but when the “play” 
icon (right-facing triangle inside the green circle) is clicked, the objects 
are activated: The red rectangle will move left, the blue circle will repel 
nearby small objects, and the red rectangle will transform into a star 
when the green square contacts the black platform. The goal is to posi-
tion the objects such that the red rectangle will transform into a star 
and enter the purple square. To successfully solve this puzzle (b), par-
ticipants must move the blue circle and the green square so that when 
“play” is clicked, the blue circle will repel the red rectangle toward the 
purple square and the green square toward the black platform. When 
the green square collides with the black platform, the red rectangle will 
become a star and thus be “admitted” into the purple box, prompting a 
“Congratulations!” message (c).
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The collision between the green square and the black 
platform effectively acted as a switch, transforming the 
red rectangle into a star and thus enabling it to enter the 
purple square. By completing all seven stages, partici-
pants gradually learned the two critical causal relations 
(Fig. 2, top row): First, the green square colliding with 
the black platform causes the red rectangle to transform 
into a star, and, second, this transformation causes (or 
enables) the star to enter the purple box.
The seven stages of the training phase were followed 
by the test phase, in which participants were asked to 
watch a video clip. The clip featured the familiar objects 
in motion, but, crucially, it violated the expected causal 
order of events: The star entered the purple box before 
the red rectangle transformed into the star, and this trans-
formation occurred before the green square collided with 
the black platform (Fig. 2, bottom row).
The control group saw exactly the same clip without 
receiving any training. After they viewed the clip, partici-
pants in both groups were asked the same set of ques-
tions regarding the temporal order of events and their 
causal beliefs. The control group’s responses served as a 
baseline and also verified that the presented temporal 
order of events was discriminable. Our prediction was 
that the responses of the control group would tend 
toward the objective temporal order, whereas those of 
the experimental group would tend toward the causal 
order of events.
Method
Participants and materials.  The experiment was 
programmed in Adobe Flex 4.5 and Box2DFlashAS3 
(Boris the Brave, 2010) and conducted over the Internet 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Sixty-six participants 
(42 male, 24 female) aged 18 to 48 years (M = 26.59, 
SD = 7.5) were recruited. Participants in the experimental 
group were paid $1, and those in the control group were 
paid $0.30; the difference in compensation was due to 
the short time taken to complete the latter condition.
Design and procedure.  Each participant was ran-
domly assigned to one of the two conditions, resulting in 
35 participants in the control group and 31 in the experi-
mental group. Participants in the control group were sim-
ply asked to click the “play” icon and carefully observe 
the events that took place.
The clip lasted for approximately 2.5 s and was pre-
sented only once. As shown in Figure 3, a red rectangle 
moved horizontally from right to left toward a purple box 
while a green square moved diagonally toward a black 
platform adjacent to the purple box. The red rectangle 
entered the purple box, and approximately1 160 ms later 
(M = 162.76 ms, SD = 8.014), it transformed into a star. 
Approximately 200 ms (M = 204.47 ms, SD = 8.567) after 
that, the green square collided with the black platform. 
Finally, a “Congratulations!” message was shown.
Participants in the experimental group completed 
seven stages of training before watching exactly the same 
clip. In each training stage, they had to position the vari-
ous objects so that when “play” was pressed, the green 
square had to collide with the black platform in order for 
the red rectangle to transform into a star and be allowed 
to enter the purple box. However, to guard against the 
possible confounding factor of the visual system being 
habituated to a certain sequence, the transformation of 
the red rectangle always took place 100 ms before 
the collision of the green square with the black platform.2 
We return to this important experimental detail in the 
Discussion section.
Time
Entrance Transformation Collision
Causal Model
Temporal Order
Collision EntranceTransformation
Fig. 2.  Design of the training and test phases of Experiment 1. In the causal model underlying the train-
ing phase (top row), the green square colliding with the black platform causes the red rectangle to trans-
form into a star, and this transformation causes (or enables) the star to enter the purple box. The temporal 
order of events during the test phase (bottom row) contradicted the causal model: The entrance of the star 
into the purple box preceded the red rectangle’s transformation into a star, and the green square collided 
with the black platform at the end of the sequence.
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After watching the test clip, both groups were shown 
the clip’s starting configuration with labels next to each 
object (as shown in Fig. 3a); they were given four prompts 
and asked to place the prompts in the same temporal 
order in which the various events had occurred. The 
prompts in the temporally correct order were as follows: 
“The target object entered the purple box,” “The target 
object became a star,” “The green square collided with 
the black platform,” “A ‘Congratulations’ message 
appeared.” Next, participants were asked to explain their 
answer by selecting one or more of the following: “That’s 
what I saw,” “That’s what makes sense,” “That’s what I 
remember from previous rounds” (available only for the 
experimental group), and “Other.” Finally, a question 
directly assessed participants’ causal beliefs by asking 
what made the red rectangle become a star in the test 
clip; the response options were as follows: “The green 
square collided with the black platform,” “The target 
object entered the purple box,” and “Other.”
Results
There was a significant difference in the selected order of 
events between the two groups, χ2(7, N = 66) = 23.48, 
p = .001. Most striking, 38.7% of the participants in the 
experimental group provided the exact causal order of 
events, and only 19.3% gave the objective temporal order. 
For the control group, these percentages were 2.9% and 
42.9%, respectively. (The chance level for each separate 
ordering was 4%.)
Figure 4 shows that 67.7% of the trained participants 
perceived the green square colliding with the black plat-
form before the red rectangle transformed into a star. So, 
as predicted, the event that was recognized as the cause 
Fig. 3.  Sample panels from the test video clip shown to participants in both conditions in Experiment 1. Panel (a) shows the initial configuration 
of the objects (the labels were only visible after the clip was finished, when participants were asked to recall the temporal order of the events). 
When the clip began, the red target rectangle and the green square both moved toward the purple box; the midpoint of movement is shown 
in (b). The target entered the purple box (c) and then transformed into a star 160 ms later (d). The transformation occurred 200 ms before the 
green square collided with the black platform. The arrows show the direction of movement and were not present during the experiment.
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was seen to temporally precede its associated effect, even 
though it actually followed it by 200 ms. The percentage 
of participants from the control group that gave this 
answer was significantly lower (37.1%), χ2(1, N = 66) = 
6.16, p = .016.
Similarly, 51.6% of participants in the experimental 
group saw the red rectangle transform into a star prior to 
entering the purple square, an order that was explicable 
in terms of the learned causal relationships but was 
objectively wrong. This contrasts with only 4 participants 
(11.4%) in the control group who reported this ordering, 
χ2(1, N = 66) = 12.60, p < .001.
The causal basis of the explanation for the observed 
reordering effect is also apparent in that 48.4% of the 
participants in the experimental group, when asked 
directly, pointed to the collision of the green square with 
the black platform as the cause of the transformation of 
the red rectangle, and that number correlated signifi-
cantly with those participants who placed the collision 
prior to the transformation, r(64) = .470, p < .01. Finally, 
there was no difference between the groups when asked 
to explain their answer: 85.7% from the experimental 
condition and 80.6% from the control condition responded 
that the order they provided was the one they saw.
Discussion
Experiment 1 showed that participants had a definite bias 
toward the causal order of events: The majority of partici-
pants in the experimental group (80.6%) perceived at 
least one of the critical events in the wrong temporal 
order, congruent with the causal beliefs that were induced 
during the training rounds.
One potential concern stems from the fact that, by the 
end of the experiment, the two groups differed not only 
in their causal beliefs but also in the number of times 
they experienced the temporal order of events. It might 
be argued, therefore, that habituation to the repeated 
temporal order led participants to reorder the events in 
the test phase. However, as mentioned in the Design and 
Procedure section, for one of the manipulated relation-
ships (collision of the green square and the black plat-
form → transformation of the red rectangle into a star), 
the order of events was inverted not only in the test clip 
but also throughout the training phase. Participants never 
witnessed the causally potent event (collision) occurring 
before its presumed effect (transformation). Thus, at least 
in respect to this relationship, the 67.7% of participants 
who responded with the causal order of events were not 
driven by habituation to a repeated temporal order but 
by causal beliefs that were established through a combi-
nation of direct instructions and the strong causal impres-
sion generated by the Michotte-like collisions.
One problematic issue with this experiment is that the 
responses of the control group also showed higher-than-
expected levels of reordering (though significantly lower 
levels than in the experimental group). Nevertheless, it 
can be argued that although we intended that this group 
hold no causal beliefs about the sequence of events, this 
was pragmatically unavoidable. Evidence supporting this 
suggestion comes from this group’s answers to the direct 
causal question, with 82.8% providing a direct cause, the 
0%
10%
20%
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40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
The Green Square Collided With the Black
Platform, and Then the Rectangle 
Transformed Into a Star
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Fig. 4.  Results of Experiment 1: percentage of participants in each group who reported the causal as 
opposed to the objective temporal order for the two critical sets of events.
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entrance of the rectangle into the box. Thus, even these 
untrained participants probably imposed some causal 
interpretation onto the sequence, which then affected 
their perception.
Experiment 2
In the second experiment, we replicated and extended 
the findings of Experiment 1 by more carefully control-
ling participants’ causal beliefs. We used the same envi-
ronment but introduced two separate training phases, 
each featuring different causal relations. Training Phase A 
consisted of seven stages suggesting, as before, that the 
collision of the green square causes the transformation of 
the red rectangle into a star. Training Phase B consisted 
of seven different stages suggesting that the entrance of 
the red rectangle into the purple square causes the trans-
formation, similar to what participants in the control 
group of Experiment 1 seemed to infer.
Regardless of condition, all participants completed a 
training phase and then a test phase with a single clip. In 
the test clip, the temporal order of events was either con-
gruent or incongruent with the causal relations presented 
in the training phase. We hypothesized that the perceived 
order in the test clip would be strongly influenced by the 
causal beliefs developed in the training phase.
Method
Participants and materials.  The experiment was 
conducted over the Internet, using Amazon Mechanical 
Turk: 163 participants (68 male, 95 female) aged 18 to 67 
years (M = 31.33, SD = 10.6) were paid $0.50 for 
participating.
Design and procedure.  This experiment used a 2 × 2 
factorial design, with type of training (A or B) and con-
gruency of test clip (either consistent or inconsistent with 
training type) as factors. In both types of training, partici-
pants completed seven stages. Training Phase A was very 
similar in design to Experiment 1, as presented in Figure 
1. The only exception was that the black platform was 
removed, and the green square had to collide with the 
purple square to transform the red rectangle into a star. 
The stages in Training Phase B were similar, but, as 
shown in Figure 5, there were two key differences. First, 
the red rectangle became a star after entering the purple 
square, thus implying that it is the entrance that causes 
the transformation (Fig. 5c), and second, the green square 
was seen as competing with the red rectangle to enter 
the purple square: If the purple square was already occu-
pied by one of the shapes, the other shape would be 
rejected and bounce off the purple square’s exterior (Fig. 
5c). Thus, in Training Phase B, the collision of the green 
square with the purple square was seen as a side effect, 
a result of the purple square being occupied by the star.
Following the training session, participants viewed the 
test clip and were asked to carefully observe the events 
that took place. The test sequence was presented once 
and was very similar to the test sequence in Experiment 1, 
as shown in Figure 3a (except for the absence of the 
black platform). This time, however, we reordered a sin-
gle event, the transformation of the rectangle into a star. 
Figure 6 summarizes the conditions in Experiment 2. In 
all conditions, the key event is the transformation of the 
rectangle into a star, which in Training Phase A was the 
result of the collision of the green square with the purple 
square and in Training Phase B was the result of the rect-
angle entering the purple square.
Two points are important to note. The first two condi-
tions received identical training (A), but, in the test clip, 
for the congruent group, the transformation of the red 
rectangle into a star occurred immediately after the colli-
sion of the green square with the purple box, whereas 
for the incongruent group, the transformation occurred 
approximately 165 ms before the collision (M = 166.15 
Fig. 5.  Sample panels from a stage in Training Phase B of Experiment 2. Panel (a) shows the initial configuration of the objects. The red rectangle 
entered the purple box without becoming a star (b). The red rectangle became a star and the green square bounced off the purple box’s exterior 
(c). This led participants to believe that the green square was “rejected” because the box was already occupied by the star. The arrows show the 
direction of movement and were not present during the experiment.
 at University College London on August 4, 2014pss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Does “Why” Tell Us “When”? 1569
ms, SD = 10.05). Similarly, for the congruent group in 
Training Phase B, the transformation occurred after the 
red rectangle entered the purple square, whereas for 
the incongruent group, it occurred 165 ms before the 
entrance (M = 167.32 ms, SD = 4.56).
The second way to compare the conditions is to 
observe that, as shown in Figure 6, the transformation of 
the red rectangle occurred 165 ms before the collision of 
the green square in the incongruent condition of Training 
Phase A and the congruent condition of Training Phase B 
but only in the former was this order incongruent with 
the causal beliefs implied during training. The same com-
parison can be made between the congruent and incon-
gruent conditions of Phases A and B, respectively, in 
which the transformation happened 165 ms before the 
entrance, but only the former group received training 
consistent with this order.
Immediately after watching the test clip, participants 
were given the same questions as in Experiment 1, 
namely, to order the events in time, to state whether they 
saw the ordering or remembered it from previous rounds, 
and, finally, to state the cause of the transformation of the 
red rectangle.
Results
In the incongruent conditions, almost none of the partici-
pants gave the correct temporal order of events (0% for 
Training Phase A and 4.9% for Training Phase B). The 
vast majority of participants in Training Phase A (95.0%) 
responded with the causal order of events. This percent-
age was lower for participants in Training Phase B 
(51.2%), but even then it was much higher than for those 
preferring the objective temporal order.
These results are even more striking when focusing on 
the specific events that were reordered in the incongru-
ent conditions. As a reminder, in both the incongruent 
condition of Training Phase A and the congruent condi-
tion of Training Phase B, the transformation of the red 
rectangle took place 165 ms before the collision of the 
green square with the purple box. However, as shown 
in Figure 7a, none of the participants who were trained 
that a collision transformed the rectangle (Training Phase 
A) reported this order, compared with 46.3% of the par-
ticipants whose training was indifferent relative to the 
order of these events, χ2(1, N = 62) = 24.22, p < .001. 
Additionally, the number of participants in the incongru-
ent condition of Training Phase A who placed the colli-
sion before the transformation was almost the same as 
the number of participants in the congruent condition of 
Training Phase A for whom the collision indeed occurred 
before the transformation.
There was an even stronger effect of prior training 
when participants responded whether the transformation 
of the rectangle into a star occurred before or after the 
star’s entrance into the purple square (Fig. 7b). When the 
training suggested that the entrance into the square 
caused the transformation (incongruent condition of 
Training Phase B), only 7.3% of participants reported the 
objective order of events in the test sequence, namely, 
that the entrance happened after the transformation. This 
percentage rose to 92.7% when the training was congru-
ent with the order of the presentation in the test sequence 
(congruent condition of Training Phase A) and is compa-
rable to the percentage of participants in the congruent 
condition of Training Phase B for whom the transforma-
tion indeed happened after the entrance. In this case, 
participants’ responses were highly determined by their 
causal beliefs and, for the incongruent condition of 
Training Phase B, the objective order was ignored.
As in Experiment 1, participants’ reported order was 
guided by their causal beliefs: Those in Training Phase A 
responded that it was the collision of the green square 
that caused the transformation of the red rectangle in the 
Collision Transformation Entrance
1 ms 165 ms
Transformation Collision Entrance
165 ms 400 ms
Entrance Transformation Collision
165 ms1 ms
Transformation Entrance Collision
165 ms 400 ms
Training Group B (Entrance Causes Transformation)
Training Group A (Collision Causes Transformation)
Congruent Order of Events in the Test Clip
Incongruent Order of Events in the Test Clip
Congruent Order of Events in the Test Clip
Incongruent Order of Events in the Test Clip
Fig. 6.  Timeline of events for the four conditions in Experiment 2. 
Each participant was placed into one of two training groups (A or B) 
and shown one of two test clips (either congruent or incongruent with 
the type of training he or she received). “Collision” refers to the colli-
sion of the green square with the purple square, “transformation” refers 
to the transformation of the red rectangle into a star, and “entrance” 
refers to the entrance of the rectangle or star into the purple square.
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test clip (82.9% for the congruent condition and 97.5% for 
the incongruent condition), whereas participants in 
Training Phase B responded that it was the entrance of 
the red rectangle into the purple square that caused its 
transformation (92.7% for the congruent condition and 
95.1% for the incongruent condition).
Finally, 79.7% of participants across conditions showed 
confidence in their response by claiming that they saw 
that specific order of events: 52.8% also said that they 
remembered the order from previous rounds, 43.6% said 
that it was the order that made sense, and 3.7% gave 
other explanations.
Discussion
Experiment 2 replicated and significantly extended the 
findings from Experiment 1. The majority of participants 
perceived the key events in the order that matched their 
causal beliefs irrespective of the temporal order of the 
presentation.
General Discussion
In two experiments, we demonstrated that the perception 
of temporal order can be strongly biased toward causally 
plausible orderings of events. In line with other studies 
(Buehner, 2012; Fernbach, Linson-Gentry, & Sloman, 
2007), our results highlight the role of causal beliefs in 
perception and show that the temporal content of per-
ception is the result of active interpretation using causal 
information.
These experiments do not show that perceptual input 
is ignored altogether. We believe that the features of the 
presented sequences in some cases assisted and in others 
hindered the conjectures that participants made. For 
example, a relatively high proportion of the untrained 
participants in Experiment 1 (i.e., those in the control 
group) wrongly perceived the green square colliding 
with the black platform before the red rectangle trans-
formed into the star. This may have been due to either 
spontaneously formed causal judgments, as argued ear-
lier, or features such as the color and size of the objects 
or the direction of movement that attracted participants’ 
attention, thus influencing the perceived order of events 
(Stelmach & Herdman, 1991).
Despite these possible attentional issues, the temporal- 
reordering effect persisted under a number of manipula-
tions. We used several different sequences and varied the 
implied causal relations while keeping constant the spa-
tial proximity of the crucial events (within 2–7 cm of each 
other) and the long temporal intervals (150–200 ms), 
which were at least twice the length of detectable inter-
vals in visual order-judgment tasks (Hirsh & Sherrick, 
1961; Kanabus, Szelag, Rojek, & Pöppel, 2002). Addition-
ally, we presented identical sequences of events to groups 
of participants with diverging causal beliefs and observed 
that those beliefs significantly influenced the reported 
order of the events.
We hypothesize that, in judging temporal order, per-
ceptual input is integrated with high-level causal knowl-
edge, with the saliency of the perceptual input and the 
strength of the causal knowledge determining the result-
ing judgment. People’s causal expectations about the way 
events unfold not only direct their attention prospectively 
but are also used retrospectively in the interpretation of 
the temporal order that the perceptual system delivers.
What remains relatively unclear is the precise mecha-
nism that operates during the demonstrated effects. 
Although, as mentioned in the Discussion section of 
Experiment 1, habituation alone does not suffice as an 
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explanation, we have not ruled out the possibility that 
causal beliefs induce temporal-order beliefs that subse-
quently lead to the reordering of the perceived events. It 
remains to be seen whether the perceptual distortion is a 
direct result of causal beliefs or, alternatively, if it is driven 
by an expectation of temporal order induced by causal 
beliefs.
At first sight, these findings appear to contradict 
recent studies that focused on sensorimotor adaptation 
(Heron, Hanson, & Whitaker, 2009; Stetson et al., 2006). 
In these experiments, participants adapted to a delay 
(e.g., 100 ms) between an action (e.g., mouse click) and 
an effect (e.g., visual flash) and then perceived the 
effect as preceding the action when the delay was 
reduced (e.g., to 50 ms). One difference between these 
studies and our findings is that the test-clip section in 
our experiments was observation only, without a cross-
modal element. Thus, there was no need for partici-
pants to synchronize input from different modalities. 
However, the critical difference is that whereas our 
experiments were designed to induce strong causal 
beliefs, in both Heron et al. (2009) and Stetson et al. 
(2006), the relationship between the action and the 
effect was left open. Thus, even if participants initially 
established a loose causal belief during the adaptation 
phase, the repeated request to temporally order the two 
events should have increased the uncertainty, which 
should have sufficed to dissolve any causal assump-
tions. In contrast, it has been shown (Buehner & 
McGregor, 2006) that established causal beliefs can 
change even default expectations, such as the short 
delay between the cause and the effect (Shanks & 
Dickinson, 1987). Similarly, the demonstrated distortion 
of the perceived temporal order was driven by and thus 
required the presence of stable causal beliefs.
Following from Hume’s (1748) original analysis, tem-
poral priority is commonly taken as a critical cue for 
causal learning and inference (Holyoak & Cheng, 2011; 
Lagnado & Sloman, 2004, 2006; White, 2006). However, 
our findings paint a more complex picture of the relation 
between temporal-order perception and causality. The 
judgment of temporal order between events, usually 
regarded as a fundamental percept, was in our experi-
ments actually determined by prior causal beliefs. 
Temporal-order perception was both a cause and an 
effect of causal judgment.
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Notes
1. Because of the online nature of the experiment, there were 
slight deviations among participants regarding the temporal 
distances between the various events, but these were not sig-
nificant. Events were logged with millisecond accuracy imme-
diately after they occurred. Thus, the logged time corresponded 
to the event onset time plus the time required for the genera-
tion of a time stamp. The time-stamp generation was tested on 
a variety of computer systems and did not exceed 0.065 ms.
2. To ensure that the red rectangle transformed 100 ms before 
the green square collided with the black platform, we sur-
rounded the black platform by an invisible object. The collision 
with that invisible object actually caused the transformation of 
the rectangle into a star.
References
Boris the Brave. (2010). Box2DFlash (Version 2.1a) [Computer 
software]. Retrieved from http://www.box2dflash.org/
Buehner, M. J. (2012). Understanding the past, predicting the 
future: Causation, not intentional action, is the root of tem-
poral binding. Psychological Science, 23, 1490–1497.
Buehner, M. J., & Humphreys, G. R. (2009). Causal bind - 
ing of actions to their effects. Psychological Science, 20, 
1221–1228.
Buehner, M. J., & McGregor, S. (2006). Temporal delays can facil-
itate causal attribution: Towards a general timeframe bias in 
causal induction. Thinking & Reasoning, 12, 353–378.
Bullock, M., & Gelman, R. (1979). Preschool children’ s assump-
tions about cause and effect: Temporal ordering. Child 
Development, 50, 89–96.
Burns, P., & McCormack, T. (2009). Temporal information 
and children’s and adults’ causal inferences. Thinking & 
Reasoning, 15, 167–196.
Fernbach, P. M., Linson-Gentry, P., & Sloman, S. A. (2007). 
Causal beliefs influence the perception of temporal order. 
In D. McNamara & J. Trafton (Eds.), Proceedings of the 29th 
Annual Cognitive Science Society (pp. 269–274). Austin, 
TX: Cognitive Science Society.
Grush, R. (2007). Time and experience. Retrieved from http://
mind.ucsd.edu/papers/time&exp/time&exp.pdf
Haggard, P., Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J. (2002). Voluntary action 
and conscious awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 5, 382–385.
Heron, J., Hanson, J. V. M., & Whitaker, D. (2009). Effect before 
cause: Supramodal recalibration of sensorimotor tim-
ing. PLoS ONE, 4(11), e7681. Retrieved from http://www 
.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal 
.pone.0007681
Hirsh, I. J., & Sherrick, C. E. (1961). Perceived order in different 
sense modalities. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 62, 
423–432.
Holyoak, K. J., & Cheng, P. W. (2011). Causal learning and 
inference as a rational process: The new synthesis. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 62, 135–163.
 at University College London on August 4, 2014pss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
1572 Bechlivanidis, Lagnado
Hume, D. (1748). An enquiry concerning human understand-
ing. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York, NY: 
Henry Holt.
Kanabus, M., Szelag, E., Rojek, E., & Pöppel, E. (2002). 
Temporal order judgement for auditory and visual stimuli. 
Acta Neurobiologiae Experimentalis, 62, 263–270.
Lagnado, D. A., & Sloman, S. A. (2004). The advantage of timely 
intervention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 30, 856–876.
Lagnado, D. A., & Sloman, S. A. (2006). Time as a guide to 
cause. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 32, 451–460.
Rankin, M. L., & McCormack, T. (2012). The temporal prior-
ity principle: At what age does this develop? Frontiers in 
Psychology, 4(178). Retrieved from http://www.frontiersin 
.org/Cognitive_Science/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00178/abstract
Scholl, B. J., & Nakayama, K. (2004). Illusory causal crescents: 
Misperceived spatial relations due to perceived causality. 
Perception, 33, 455–469.
Shanks, D. R., & Dickinson, A. (1987). Associative accounts of 
causality judgement. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), Psychology of 
learning and motivation: Advances in research and theory 
(Vol. 21, pp. 229–261). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Stelmach, L. B., & Herdman, C. M. (1991). Directed attention 
and perception of temporal order. Journal of Experimen-
tal Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 17, 
539–550.
Stetson, C., Cui, X., Montague, R. P., & Eagleman, D. M. (2006). 
Motor-sensory recalibration leads to an illusory reversal of 
action and sensation. Neuron, 51, 651–659.
White, P. A. (2006). How well is causal structure inferred from 
cooccurrence information? European Journal of Cognitive 
Psychology, 18, 454–480.
 at University College London on August 4, 2014pss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
